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RANDOLPH V. FRANKLIN INVESTMENT CO.:
FORFEITURE OF DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO
GIVE REASONABLE
NOTICE OF RESALE UNDER THE DEFAULT
PROVISIONS OF THE U.C.C.
Part Five, Article Nine, of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)'
governs the rights of the secured party (creditor)2 and his debtor3 in the
event of default.4 One of the steps the creditor must ordinarily take to
comply with Part Five is to send the debtor "reasonable notification" of
any sale of the repossessed collateral.5 While section 9-504(3) plainly im-
1. U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-507 (1972 Official Text). Begun in 1942 as a joint project of
the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, the Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated in 1951. General Comment to
Uniform Commercial Code at ix, xi (1972 Official Text). Since then, it has been enacted in
every state except Louisiana, in the District of Columbia, and in the Virgin Islands. Table 1,
id. at xxxv. The Code was enacted for the District of Columbia on Dec. 30, 1963, by Pub. L.
No. 88-243, 77 Stat. 630 (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 28: 1-101 to 10-104 (1973)).
The purposes of the Code are "(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-102(2). Underlying the Code is the concept that commer-
cial transactions is a single subject of the law, despite its many aspects. General Comment,
id at x. Article Nine propounds a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security
interests in personal property and fixtures. Id § 9-101, Official Comment.
2. A securedparty is "a lender, seller or other person in whose favor there is a security
interest, including a person to whom accounts or chattel paper have been sold." U.C.C. § 9-
105(l)(m). A security interest is "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of
goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer. . . is limited in effect to a reserva-
tion of a 'security interest.' " Id. § 1-201(37).
3. A debtor is "the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation
secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of
accounts or chattel paper." Id § 9-105(l)(d).
4. The Code does not define default but, rather, indicates that what constitutes default
in a particular situation is a function of the security agreement. See id. § 9-501 (1). A security
agreement is "an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." Id § 9-
105(I)(/). Since a security interest secures payment or performance of an obligation, see
note 2 supra, default is the failure of the debtor to pay or otherwise perform what the secur-
ity agreement requires of him.
5. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of
a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time
and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any
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poses a duty of notification upon the creditor, it states no specific sanction
for the breach of this duty. Instead, section 9-507(1) provides the debtor
with a general action for damages should his creditor dispose of the repos-
sessed collateral in violation of any of the provisions of Part Five - in-
cluding the notification requirement.6 A growing number of courts have
concluded that the section 9-507(1) action for damages inadequately pro-
tects the debtor's right to notification of resale under section 9-504(3). 7 In
Randolph v. Franklin Investment Co. ,' the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals joined these courts by holding that a creditor who fails to send
proper notice of resale is not entitled to a deficiency judgment.9
Joseph and Antoinette Randolph purchased a used Pontiac from Lee
Ford in November, 1968. They were consistently late in making payments
under the terms of their contract, which the dealer had assigned without
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured
party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying his right to notification of sale.
U.C.C. § 9-504(3). To send notqication means
to deposit in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual means of
communication with postage or cost of transmission provided for and properly ad-
dressed and in the case of an instrument to an address specified thereon or other-
wise agreed, or if there be none to any address reasonable under the circumstances.
The receipt of any writing or notice within the time at which it would have arrived
if properly sent has the effect of a proper sending.
Id § 1-201(38). If the collateral is consumer goods, see note 35 infra, no other notification
need be sent. 1d § 9-504(3). Unless the secured party has sent notification to the debtor or
the debtor has renounced his rights, notification must also be sent to any other secured party
from whom the secured party has received written notice of a claim of an interest in collat-
eral other than consumer goods. Id
6. The damages the debtor may recover are "any loss caused by a failure to comply
with the provisions of this Part." Id § 9-507(1). "If the collateral is consumer goods, the
debtor may recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten
per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus 10 per cent of
the cash price." Id The drafters term this penalty for the improper disposition of consumer
goods a "minimum recovery." Id, Official Comment 1.
7. See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963)
(applying Pennsylvania law), vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Atlas
Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972); Braswell v. American
Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309
A.2d 329 (Me. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d
1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
8. 398 A.2d 340 (D.C. 1979) (rehearing en banc).
9. Id at 347. In a companion case, the court not only deprived a secured creditor of
his right to a deficiency judgment for failure to give notice of resale but also permitted the
defaulting debtor to collect the minimum recovery for the improper resale of consumer
goods. Gavin v. Washington Post Employees Fed. Credit Union, 397 A.2d 968 (D.C. 1979).
Indeed, in Randolph itself, the court parenthetically remarked that its limitation on the re-
covery of a deficiency does not negate the creditor's liability in damages to his debtor. 398
A.2d at 343 n.4.
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recourse to the Franklin Investment Company.' ° In September, 1969,
Franklin repossessed the car and eventually sold it for scrap at a private
sale four months after an advertised public sale had elicited no bids."
Franklin did not notify the Randolphs of the private sale, although it ar-
guably had given them the notice of public sale required by section 9-
504(3).12 After hearing evidence on the car's resale value, the trial court
offset $378 against the claimed deficiency of $1,128 and awarded Franklin
a judgment of $750. Since the car had sold for $125, the trial court implic-
itly valued it at $503 by allowing the $378 setoff. 3
On appeal, the Randolphs argued that, by failing to give the required
notice of the private sale, Franklin had forfeited its right to a deficiency
judgment under section 9-504(2) of the Code." The three-judge panel
held that the purpose of the section 9-504(3) notice provision is to afford
the debtor an opportunity to protect the full value of his collateral. This
purpose, the panel reasoned, had been effectuated by the trial court's re-
duction of the deficiency judgment by an amount equal to the fair market
value of the car's resale price. 5
On rehearing, the full court vacated the panel's opinion and reversed,
holding that the secured creditor who fails to give notice of resale may not
pursue a deficiency judgment; rather, he is limited to the proceeds of the
improper disposition, however inadequate they may be. 16 The court rea-
soned that the secured creditor's failure to give proper notice could not be
judicially cured because of the substantial prejudice to the debtor's right of
redemption and to his ability to defend himself against a deficiency suit. 7
Should the debtor wish to redeem his property, he must have adequate
10. 398 A.2d at 341.
11. Id at 342.
12. Id Franklin sent the Randolphs notice of the proposed public sale by certified
mail. Although this notice was returned unclaimed, proof of receipt was unnecessary. Fur-
ther, the Randolphs had actual knowledge of the repossession of their car. Randolph v.
Franklin Inv. Co., 368 A.2d 1151, 1155-56 (D.C. 1977), rev'd on rehearing en bane, 398 A.2d
340 (1979).
13. 398 A.2d at 342. The damages due the Randolphs under § 9-507(1), see note 6 and
accompanying text supra, were not set off against the deficiency because the trial court had
denied their motion to amend their answer by filing a counterclaim. See 368 A.2d at 1156.
The full court reversed and remanded to permit the Randolphs to pursue their § 9-507(1)
remedy. See 398 A.2d at 351.
14. See 398 A.2d at 342-43. Several other issues were raised on appeal, including
whether the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1971 precluded the trial court from award-
ing a deficiency judgment even had Franklin given fully adequate notice of resale. See note
102 and accompanying text infra.
15. 368 A.2d at 1155-56.
16. 398 A.2d at 343.
17. See id at 345-47.
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notice of a contemplated resale in order to make necessary arrangements."
Furthermore, even in the absence of redemption, notice of resale would
enable the debtor to attend the sale and thereby put him in the best possi-
ble position to produce evidence to rebut the contention, in a deficiency
suit, that the creditor had disposed of the property at a reasonable price. 9
Such considerations, the court concluded, justified making proper notifica-
tion a condition precedent to the creditor's right to a deficiency judg-
ment.20
1. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION, AND CONDITION
PRECEDENT: THE SPECTRUM OF JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
UNDER THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND ITS
PREDECESSOR
Many of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions governing default
have their historical antecedents in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
(U.C.S.A.).21 Under the Act, the seller could either notify the buyer of his
intention to retake the goods upon default22 or retake without notice and
then retain the goods for a ten-day period during which the buyer might
redeem.23 If the buyer did not redeem the goods and had paid at least fifty
per cent of their purchase price, the seller was required to sell the goods at
public auction, with notice to both the buyer and the public.24 If less than
18. Id at 345.
19. Id.
20. See id at 347.
21. 2 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (1922). Approved in 1918, the Act was withdrawn in 1943
because it needed substantial revision, "particularly in the light of developments in install-
ment credit and financing practices." Eleven jurisdictions had adopted it: Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Wisconsin in 1919; West Virginia, 1921; Penn-
sylvania, 1925; with modifications: New York, 1922; Indiana, 1935; and Hawaii, 1941.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE 67 (1943).
22. U.C.S.A. § 17. To be served upon the buyer personally or by registered mail 20 to
40 days before retaking, the notice was to state the fact of default, the period after which the
goods would be retaken, and the buyer's rights upon retaking. If the buyer did not cure the
default before retaking, he lost his right of redemption. Id Retaking had to be by legal
process if it could not be accomplished without breach of the peace. 1d § 16.
23. Id § 18. The seller could immediately resell perishable goods. The buyer could
make a written demand, delivered personally or by registered mail to the seller, for a written
statement of the sum due under the contract and the expense of retaking, keeping, and stor-
ing the goods. Failure to furnish such a statement within a reasonable time exposed the
seller to a $10 fine and liability for damages. Id
24. Id § 19. The seller himself could bid at the auction, which had to be held not more
than 30 days after retaking. The notice requirements were numerous. First, the seller had to
give the buyer 10 days' written notice of the sale, either personally or by registered mail.
1016 [Vol. 29:1013
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fifty per cent of the purchase price had been paid, the buyer could demand
the sale of the goods.25 Absent such a demand, the seller could voluntarily
resell the goods26 or retain them as his own, thus discharging the buyer of
liability for the balance due under the contract.27 The proceeds of any
resale were applied to the cost of the resale; the expenses of retaking, keep-
ing, and storing the goods; and the satisfaction of the debt.28 The buyer
was entitled to any surplus 29 and was liable for any deficiency.3"
Failure to comply with the default provisions of the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act rendered the seller liable to his buyer, who could recover
the greater of his actual damages or one-fourth the sum of all payments
made under the contract plus interest.3 ' Although the Act specified no
other penalty for noncompliance, courts construing the default provisions
of the Act generally held a properly conducted resale to be a condition
precedent to the seller's right to recover a deficiency.
32
Second, at least five days before the sale, the seller had to post at least three notices of the
sale in different public places within the filing district where the auction was to occur. Fi-
nally, if the buyer had paid $500 or more on the purchase price, the seller had to give notice
at least five days before the sale by publication in a newspaper published or having a general
circulation within the filing district where the auction was to occur. 'Id
25. Id § 20. The demand had to be made in writing within 10 days of the retaking.
The sale had to be conducted in conformity with § 19 within 30 days of the demand. Id
The purpose of the buyer in demanding a resale would have been to determine his equity in
the goods. Id § 19, Commissioners' Note.
26. Id. § 20.
27. Id § 23. The seller had no obligation to account to the buyer except as provided in
§ 25. Id See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
28. Id. § 21.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 22.
31. Id § 25.
Some penalty is necessary in order to insure that the resale will take place. It seems
fair to allow the buyer his actual damages (the difference between the amount of
his part payments and the value of the use of the property which he has had, and
also the value of his bargain) and to fix a minimum penalty to be recovered in all
cases. This will protect the buyer in all cases where his equity is of any appreciable
value.
Id, Commissioners' Note.
32. See, e.g., Bulldog Concrete Form Sales Corp. v. Taylor, 94 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ind.
1950), a,9'd, 195 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying Indiana law: to recover deficiency, seller
must strictly comply with statutory requirements as to length of time and contents of notice
but not as to form of notice); United Sec. Corp. v. Tomlin, 198 A.2d 179 (Del. Super. Ct.
1964) (no right to deficiency when car sold without required notice and public auction);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 195 A.2d 546, motion for rehearing denied, 196 A.2d
214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963) (failure to give statutory notice of resale of car discharges buyer
from contract and entitles him to recover damages or penalty); Frantz Equip. Co. v. Ander-
son, 37 N.J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962) (noncompliance with statutory provisions governing
resale deprives seller of right to deficiency judgment and makes him liable for damages);
Bancredit, Inc. v. Meyers, 62 N.J. Super. 77, 162 A.2d 109 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)
101719801
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Unlike the Act, the Uniform Commercial Code contains no provision
for an optional notice of intention to retake upon default. Instead, the
Code simply gives the secured creditor the right to repossess the collat-
eral,33 which the debtor, under section 9-506, has the right to redeem any
time before the creditor has disposed of it or retained it in satisfaction of
the obligation.34 If the collateral is consumer goods35 and the debtor has
paid sixty per cent of the cash price in the case of a purchase money secur-
ity interest16 or sixty per cent of the loan in the case of another security
interest, the creditor must resell the collateral.37 Otherwise, unless the
debtor objects, the creditor may propose to retain the collateral in satisfac-
tion of the obligation.31 Under section 9-504(3), the debtor is entitled to
"reasonable notification" of the disposition of the collateral, which must be
"commercially reasonable" and which may be conducted by public or pri-
vate sale.3 9 The proceeds of the resale are to be applied first to the reason-
able expenses of repossession and disposition and then to the satisfaction
of indebtedness secured by the collateral. 4' The debtor is entitled to any
surplus and is liable for any deficiency arising from the disposition.
4, If
(improper notice of auto resale deprives seller of deficiency judgment and renders him liable
for penalty in absence of actual damages); Capitol Dist. L.A.W. Corp. v. Blake, 136 Misc.
651, 241 N.Y.S. 476 (Albany City Ct. 1930) (actual knowledge of resale cannot cure non-
compliance with statutory notice provisions, which deprives seller of right to deficiency but
does not expose him to damages or penalty unless resale was compulsory rather than volun-
tary).
33. U.C.C. § 9-503. The secured party may proceed by action or without judicial proc-
ess if he can avoid breach of the peace. Id.
34. To redeem, the debtor must tender fulfillment of all obligations secured by the col-
lateral as well as the creditor's reasonable expenses for repossessing the collateral and ar-
ranging for its disposition. Id. § 9-506.
35. Consumer goods are those "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or
household purposes." Id § 9-109(1).
36. A purchase money security interest is a security interest that is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value
is in fact so used.
Id § 9-107.
37. ld § 9-505(l). If the creditor fails to dispose of the collateral within 90 days of
repossession, the debtor may recover in conversion or under section 9-507(1). 1d See note
42 and accompanying text infra.
38. Id. § 9-505(2). The creditor must send written notice of his proposal to the debtor,
who must object in writing within 21 days to compel disposition. Id
39. See note 5 supra. The secured party may buy at any public sale and at a private
sale "if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type
which is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations." U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
40. Id § 9-504(1)
41. Id. § 9-504(2)
1018 [Vol. 29:1013
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the creditor does not comply with the Code's default provisions, section 9-
507(1) renders him liable to the debtor, who can recover actual damages in
all cases and, in the case of consumer goods, a penalty in lieu of dam-
ages.42
Courts ruling on the relationship between the creditor's duty of notifica-
tion imposed by the Code and his right to a deficiency have generated a
full spectrum of responses. 43 At one end of this spectrum, a few courts
have allowed the noncomplying creditor his deficiency less any proved
damages or penalty to which section 9-507(1) entitles the debtor.44 In con-
cluding that the creditor's failure to give the required section 9-504(3) no-
tice of resale does not excuse the debtor from liability for his debt, these
courts have uniformly relied upon the action for damages expressly given
the debtor in section 9-507(1) and upon the absence of any explicit indica-
tion in Part Five that noncompliance with its provisions deprives the credi-
tor of his right to a deficiency.45 Such courts have also provided that the
debtor defending in a deficiency suit may assert his action for damages as a
setoff or counterclaim. 46 The common assumption of these courts is that
section 9-507(1) is the debtor's exclusive remedy for the creditor's noncom-
pliance with the notice requirements of Part Five of the Code.
In the middle of the spectrum of judicial rulings on the consequences of
creditor noncompliance with the Code's notice requirement, many courts
have imposed a rebuttable presumption that the collateral was worth the
amount of the debt, thus requiring the noncomplying creditor to prove that
the collateral was worth less than this amount in order to recover a defi-
ciency.47 Like the courts which have adopted the exclusive remedy rule,
42. See note 6 supra.
43. See, e.g., Note, 4 Creditor's Right to a Deficiency Judgment Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Effect of Lack of Notice, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 56 (1975); Note,
Denial of Deficiency. A Problem of Reasonable Notice Under UCC § 9-504(3), 34 OHIO ST.
L.J. 657 (1973); Note, The Right to an Article 9 Deficiency Judgment Without 9-504 Notice of
Resale, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 465 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35 (1964); Chase Man-
hattan Bank v. Lyon Air, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); Mallicoat v.
Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966), as modified on
rehearing, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 49 (1967); Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App.
866, 496 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1972).
45. See note 44 supra.
46. Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. at 43; Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Lyon Air, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1121; Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash.
App. at 870, 496 P.2d at 969.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974) (apply-
ing Texas law), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1975); Leasing Assocs., Inc. v. Slaughter & Son,
Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1971) (applying Arkansas law); Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v.
Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970); Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark.
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these courts have emphasized the advantage to the debtor of the express
section 9-507(1) remedy for creditor noncompliance and the absence of
any suggestion in Part Five that the creditor forfeits his right to a defi-
ciency by failing to give notice of resale.48 In Norton v. National Bank of
Commerce," 9 the court which created the rebuttable presumption rule spe-
cifically rationalized going beyond the express provisions and obvious im-
plications of the Code. Noting that the creditor's failure to give notice
makes it harder for the debtor to sustain his burden of proving loss with
reasonable certainty, the court concluded that it "would be manifestly un-
fair for the creditor to derive an advantage from its own misconduct."5
To redress this perceived unfairness, the court simply shifted the burden of
proof from the unnotified debtor, where section 9-507(1) places it,5 , to the
noncomplying creditor.52
In order to exercise his right to a deficiency under the rebuttable pre-
sumption rule, the creditor must make one of two showings: first, that the
resale was conducted according to the requirements of the Code, including
the giving of proper notice, in which case the amount received at the sale is
evidence of the collateral's true value; or, second, that the amount received
at an improperly conducted sale represented the true value of the collat-
eral, which must be independently established. 53 Such a rule not only pre-
cludes the offending creditor from benefiting from his failure to give notice
but also enhances the power of section 9-507(1) to compensate the ag-
grieved debtor for the violation of his section 9-504(3) right to notifica-
tion 54 and his section 9-506 right of redemption.
55
143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d
402 (Ocean County Dist. Ct. 1971), afdper curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 521, 288 A.2d 872
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
48. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d at 696; Conti Causeway Ford v.
Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. at 385-86, 276 A.2d at 404-05.
49. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
50. Id at 149-50, 398 S.W.2d at 542. The court continued:
We think the just solution is to indulge the presumption in the first instance that
the collateral was worth at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to the
creditor the burden of proving the amount that should reasonably have been ob-
tained through a sale conducted according to law.
Id at 150, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
51. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) requires the debtor to bear the burden of proving whatever dam-
ages he hopes to collect, which would include establishing the fair market value of the collat-
eral at the time of resale.
52. Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. at 149-50, 398 S.W.2d at 542.
53. See Leasing Assocs., Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d at 177; Universal C.I.T.
Credit Co. v. Rone, 248 Ark. at 669, 453 S.W.2d at 39-40.
54. See United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d at 695; Leasing Assocs., Inc. v.
Slaughter & Son, Inc. 450 F.2d at 177.
55. See United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d at 696.
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At the other end of the spectrum of rulings on the relationship between
the duty of notification and the right to a deficiency, many courts have
held that the secured creditor who fails to give his debtor proper notice of
resale forfeits his right to a deficiency.56 Such courts have sometimes rea-
soned that, because the section 9-507(1) action for damages is not an ex-
pressly exclusive remedy for the violation of the section 9-504(3) notice
requirement, the Code's policy of deferring to supplementary principles of
law and equity, expressed in section 1-103," 7 empowers the courts to re-
quire proper notice of resale as a condition precedent to a creditor's right
to a deficiency judgment.58 Specific authority for grafting the condition
precedent rule onto the Code has been found in adjudication under the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act.5 9 For example, in Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co. ,60 the court reasoned that the judicial
denial of a deficiency for noncompliance with the Act's notice requirement
was so established that the drafters of the Code would have expressly repu-
diated it had they intended courts to rule differently under the Code.6
The Leasco court also found implicit support for the condition prece-
dent rule in the structure and language of the Code itself. The court rea-
soned that the structural conjunction, within a single section of the Code,6 2
of the right of the creditor to a deficiency and his duty to notify the debtor
implies that the exercise of the right logically depends upon the discharge
of the duty.6 3 Furthermore, the court relied upon the language of section
56. See note 7 supra.
57. "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103.
58. See Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21;
Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d at 332.
59. Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d at 330-31; Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d at 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16. See also notes 21-32
and accompanying text supra.
60. 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
61. If the authors of the Uniform Commercial Code proposed to overthrow the
firmly established and generally accepted construction of the [Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act] denying recovery for a deficiency where there was not precise
compliance with the notice requirement, they surely would have manifested that
intent in clear and unambiguous language. In fact, there is not the slightest intima-
tion of any such purpose to be found in the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id. at 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16 (citation omitted).
62. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2), (3).
63. It surely has meaning that the very section that affirms the right to a deficiency
judgment after sale of a repossessed article also describes in simple and practical
terms the rules governing dispositions as well as the pertinent notice requirements.
If a secured creditor's right to a deficiency judgment were intended to be independ-
19801 1021
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9-507(1): "If the disposition has occurred the debtor . . . has a right to
recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with
the provisions of this Part." Such language, the court concluded, plainly
contemplates an affirmative action for damages sustained, not a defense
against an impermissible deficiency suit.
64
Like those courts that have adopted the rebuttable presumption rule,65
the courts preferring the condition precedent rule stress the significance of
the section 9-506 right of the debtor to redeem the collateral and the sub-
stantial prejudice to this right arising from the creditor's failure to give the
notice of resale required by section 9-504(3).66 One such court has implic-
itly justified preferring the condition precedent rule over the rebuttable
presumption rule on the ground that the section 9-507(1) right of action for
damages cannot fully compensate the debtor, who, because of his credi-
tor's failure to give notice, has lost his right to redeem his property in spe-
cie.
67
Thus, when the District of Columbia Court of Appeals sat en banc to
reconsider the issue of whether and under what conditions Part Five of the
Code permits a creditor who has not notified his debtor of resale to recover
a deficiency, it had access to a fully articulated spectrum of answers and
arguments. By permitting a deficiency less a setoff for the amount by
which the actual value of the collateral exceeded its resale price, the trial
court had applied the rebuttable presumption rule.68 The three-judge
panel affirmed the trial court's judgment without explicitly considering the
alternatives available in the exclusive remedy and condition precedent
rules.69 The task facing the full court was, therefore, to adopt one of the
three lines of authority for the District and to explain persuasively its rea-
sons for doing so.
ent of compliance with those rules, one would surely expect that unusual concept
to be delineated with clarity. The natural inference [sic] that the right depends
upon compliance is forcefully underlined by the joining of the two provisions in
one section.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d at 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d at
16.
64. Id. at 1092, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
65. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
66. See Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. at 702; Braswell v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. at 701, 161 S.E.2d at 422.
67. See Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d at 333.
68. See Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d at 342, 347.
69. See Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 368 A.2d at 1155-56.
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II. RANDOLPH V. FRANKLIN INVESTMENT Co.: THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT RULE AND THE LIMITS OF PERSUASIVE
CONSTRUCTION
In Randolph v. Franklin Investment Co., the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held proper notice of resale to be a condition precedent to a
deficiency judgment because of the substantial prejudice to debtors in the
absence of such notice, which any creditor can easily give to his debtor.7"
This prejudice consists of the foreclosure of the debtor's right of redemp-
tion and the added difficulty of showing, by way of defense in a deficiency
suit, that the creditor did not dispose of the collateral at a reasonable
price.7 ' Such considerations, the court asserted, "are solid reasons why
failure to give notice can never (in the absence of actual notice) be deemed
harmless."72
The court's suggestion that the creditor's failure to give notice of resale
forecloses the debtor's right of redemption assumes that the purpose of the
notice is to enable the debtor to redeem: without reasonable notice of re-
sale, the debtor will not have a clear idea of how much time he has to
make arrangements necessary for redemption.73 Although the notice re-
quired by section 9-504(3) of the Code does not have to inform the debtor
of his right to redeem,74 the logical nexus between the Code's notice re-
quirement and the ability of the debtor to exercise his right of redemption
is evident from a comparison of the provisions of the Code with those of its
predecessor, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. The Act required the
seller to retain the goods within reach of the buyer for ten days to allow
him to redeem them if he could raise the money.75 The Code dropped this
requirement and substituted a combination of provisions for "reasonable
notification" of resale and for the debtor's right to redeem any time before
the creditor's disposition or retention of the collateral.76 The effect of the
Code's notice provisions is, therefore, to preserve, through the requirement
70. 398 A.2d at 347. The majority noted that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 55-I(b) bars recovery
of a deficiency judgment after repossession of personal property unless the plaintiff-creditor
has complied with applicable law and resold the property for a fair and reasonable price.
Id. at 344 & n.7. Rule 55-11(b) does not, however, add substantive content to such law. Id
at 347.
71. Id. at 345.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. See notes 34 & 39 supra.
75. U.C.S.A. § 18, Commissioners' Note (act withdrawn 1943). See note 23 and accom-
panying text supra.
76. See notes 34, 39 and accompanying text supra; U.C.C. § 9-504(3), Official Comment
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of reasonable notice of resale, a minimum period of time for redemption
which the Act had secured by other means.
Although a comparison of the pertinent sections of the Act and the Code
illuminates the importance the drafters of the Code attached to notice of
resale as a means of securing an interval during which the debtor might
redeem, the Randolph court did not conduct this analysis. Nor did the
court reason that because of this special function of reasonable notice of
resale under the Code, holding proper notice a condition precedent to a
deficiency judgment is more warranted under the Code than it had been
under the Act.7 7 Even if the court had so reasoned, it could not gainsay
the incompatibility of the condition precedent rule with commercial rea-
sonableness.78 Although section 1-103 of the Code permits the use of sup-
plementary principles of law and equity such as the condition precedent
rule, section 1-106(1) indicates the drafters' intent that remedies be admin-
istered in a generally compensatory rather than in a penal spirit.79 In so
providing, the Code incorporates the common law principle that compen-
satory, but not punitive, damages are recoverable for breach of contract.8°
77. Courts which have appealed to judicial construction of the Act as authority for
adopting the condition precedent rule under the Code have not argued for the special func-
tion of notice under the Code. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra. The Ran-
do/ph court did, however, cite Professor Gilmore, 398 A.2d at 347, who argues that the
judicial use of the condition precedent rule under the Act is authority for its use under the
Code. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.4, at 1261-
64 (1965). Curiously, Gilmore does not base his argument on the importance of notice in
securing an interval for redemption under the Code but upon the greater ease of giving
notice under the Code than under the Act. Id See notes 5, 24 supra.
78. Another court observed:
In the situation where reasonable notice of sale has not been given, the spirit of
commercial reasonableness requires that the secured party not be arbitrarily de-
prived of his deficiency but that the burden of proof be shifted to him to prove that
the sale resulted in the fair and reasonable value of the security being credited to
the debtor's account. When that burden has been borne, the resultant deficiency
ought to be collectable by the secured party, especially in view 9f the rights to
damages afforded the debtor by [section 9-507 (1)].
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. at 386, 276 A.2d at 404-05.
79. The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be
had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.
U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
80. "Where a right of action for breach exists, compensatory damages will be given for
the net amount of the losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant's breach, in excess
of savings made possible .... " RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932). "Punitive
damages are not recoverable for breach of contract." Id, § 342, to which Comment a adds:
"Damages are punitive when they are assessed by way of punishment to the wrongdoer or
example to others and not as the money equivalent of harm done." See 5 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 992 (1964); 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. 1968).
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Section 9-507(1) makes an exception to this principle by granting the ag-
grieved consumer-debtor a minimum recovery capable of penalizing the
creditor.8 ' The Code does not, however, create a further exception by pro-
viding for the denial of a deficiency judgment because of the failure of the
creditor to give proper notice of resale to his debtor. Thus, to adopt the
condition precedent rule is tantamount to writing into Part Five the addi-
tional penalty of the creditor's forfeited deficiency, a result neither author-
ized by the letter nor contemplated by the spirit of the Code.82
The court further reasoned that the general requirement that a creditor's
disposition of collateral upon default be "commercially reasonable" 83 is
inadequate to protect the debtor's interest in the collateral.84 Thus, one
purpose of the notice requirement must be to enable the debtor to make
the best defense possible if he is sued for a deficiency: unless he attends
the sale, the debtor will be hard pressed to produce evidence, even if avail-
able, to rebut the contention that the creditor disposed of the property at a
reasonable price.85
The drafters of the Code thought otherwise. They perceived the princi-
pal limitation on the right of the secured party to dispose of the collateral
to be the requirement that he proceed in good faith86 and in a commer-
cially reasonable manner - a requirement deriving substance from the
tests of commercial reasonableness stated by section 9-507(2) and the sec-
tion 9-507(1) remedies of injunctive relief, damages, and minimum recov-
81. See note 6 supra. Depending upon the facts, the minimum recovery may well not
only exceed a consumer-debtor's actual loss but also wipe out any deficiency. See J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-
14, at 998-99 (1972).
82. In addition to resulting in a double penalty for the creditor in consumer transac-
tions, consisting of the § 9-507(1) minimum recovery and the forfeited deficiency, the adop-
tion of the condition precedent rule introduces the latter penalty into purely commercial
transactions. Said one court concerning the place of penalties in commercial transactions
under the U.C.C.: "No sound policy requires us to inject a drastic punitive element into a
commercial context." Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, 501, 209 N.W.2d 341,
344 (1973).
83. U.C.C. § 9-504(3). See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
84. See 398 A.2d at 346.
85. See id. at 345. Although the court cited no authority for this proposition, another
court concluded similarly:
The purpose of [the section 9-504 (3) notice], without doubt, is to enable the debtor
to protect his interest in the property by paying the debt, finding a buyer or being
present at the sale to bid on the property or have others do so, to the end that it not
be sacrificed by a sale at less than its true value.
Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. at 112, 415 S.W.2d at 350.
86. "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203.
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ery for the consumer-debtor.87 Furthermore, the fact that section 9-504(3)
requires merely reasonable notification of the time after which any disposi-
tion other than a public sale is to be made suggests that the purpose of the
notice is not to enable the defaulting debtor to be present at every sale to
protect his interest in the collateral.88 Indeed, the Official Comments to
section 9-504 confirm this implication, for although the drafters provided
for public sales, they sought to encourage the "private sale through com-
mercial channels" in the belief that it would "result in higher realization
on collateral for the benefit of all parties."89 These parties could include
not only the debtor but other secured creditors with interests in the collat-
eral, and it is their participation in a private sale which the notice require-
ment contemplates. The first paragraph of the Official Comment presents
the requirement of reasonable notification to the debtor as the means of
securing an interval during which he may redeem the collateral.90 The
second paragraph then explains that the function of notice regarding other
secured parties is to enable them "to take appropriate steps to protect their
interests by taking part in the sale or other disposition if they so desire."9'
Thus, the assumption of the Code seems to be that if the debtor is incapa-
ble or undesirous of redeeming, he has no further role to play. Other se-
cured parties, however, would probably be both capable and desirous of
participating in the disposition. Protecting the interests of both debtor and
other secured parties, of course, is the requirement of good faith and com-
mercial reasonableness.
Underlying the court's distrust of the ability of the reasonableness re-
quirement to assure the debtor that he has received credit for the full value
of the collateral is what the court presented as "the questionable quality of
evidence at the trial."92 The court suggested that the problem of inade-
quate evidence of the fair market value of collateral is inherent in all cases
in which proper notice of resale has not been given, leaving a conscientious
appellate court no alternative to adoption of the condition precedent
rule.93 In Randolph, the trial judge noted the lack of evidence establishing
87. See U.C.C. § 9-507, Official Comment 1.
88. The court partially conceded the point: "[Aibsent a requirement of notice of the
exact time and place of sale (in contrast with the notice required for a public sale or auction),
notice of the time left prior to private sale is especially significant, for the debtor's option at
that point is virtually limited to redemption . 398 A.2d at 345.
89. U.C.C. § 9-504, Official Comment 1.
90. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
91. U.C.C. § 9-504, Official Comment 5.
92. See 398 A.2d at 346.
93. See id
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the actual condition of the car, which in average condition could have
been worth between $375 and $800. 9 4 Given the facts that no bids were
placed on the car at an advertised public sale and that Franklin sold it as
scrap for $125 at a private sale four months later, the trial judge, employ-
ing the rebuttable presumption rule, probably did more than justice by the
Randolphs when he implicitly valued the car at $503.95 Even had the ap-
pellate court been unwilling to accept this valuation, however, it could
have protected the Randolphs fully by remanding with the instruction that
they be given credit for the maximum $800 which their repossessed car
could have been worth. Alternatively, the court could have held that the
trial court erred in applying the rebuttable presumption rule by awarding a
deficiency judgment despite the failure of Franklin to rebut the presump-
tion that the collateral was worth the amount of the debt. Thus, the quali-
ty of evidence in the case was not the insurmountable obstacle to justice
upon which the court claimed it relied in adopting the condition precedent
rule.
In fact, the rebuttable presumption rule relieves the unnotified debtor of
any evidential burden as to fair market value in a deficiency suit96 without
having the condition precedent rule's necessarily punitive impact on the
noncomplying creditor.97 Because of this consideration, another court
concluded that the rebuttable presumption rule, no less than the condition
precedent rule, encourages compliance with the notice requirements of sec-
tion 9-504(3) and appears more consonant with the scheme of the Code.9
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, referred to the re-
buttable presumption rule not to give it serious consideration but to reject
it summarily,99 and the court further appears to have reviewed the cases
from other jurisdictions so superficially that it thought the rebuttable pre-
sumption rule and the exclusive remedy rule' 00 to be an undifferentiated
line of authority.' 0 '
The unpersuasiveness of the court's statutory construction, its cursory
consideration of judicial precedent, and its inability to point to an inequi-
table disposition of the case at trial suggest that the court may have had an
ulterior motive for holding as it did in Randolph v. Franklin In vestment Co.
94. Id. at 344 n.8.
95. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 77-82 and accompanying text supra.
98. United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d at 695. See notes 54-55, 77-82 and
accompanying text supra.
99. 398 A.2d at 347-48.
100. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
101. See 398 A.2d at 347 & n.12.
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For example, at one point in its opinion, the court characterized the pur-
poses and practices of repossessing creditors as inherently suspect.'
0 2
Whether or not such a motive existed, the secured party must now plead
and prove reasonable notice of resale as a condition precedent to his right
to recover a deficiency." 3 He must show both notice and the reasonable-
102. See id at 346. Speculation as to this motive must remain tentative because the
court's opinion seems paradoxical. On the one hand, the court presents itself as engaging in
judicial activism to defend the hapless debtors of unscrupulous creditors. See id Relying
upon a 1971 study of automobile deficiency judgments in the District of Columbia, the court
concluded that the availability of a deficiency judgment encourages the creditor to settle for
less than "the highest possible price" because of laziness or a desire to minimize his own
proceeds so that his affiliated purchaser can maximize his profit on his subsequent sale of the
collateral back to the public. Id. Although the court acknowledged that Franklin seemed
unaffected by such disincentives, it reasoned that "the rule of law governing the legal conse-
quences to a secured creditor for failure to give the requisite notice of resale must be uni-
form for all creditors, based on the range of commercial practices realistically to be
anticipated." Id.
On the other hand, the court could have dealt more severely with automobile financers
such as Franklin by holding that the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1971 precluded the
trial court from awarding a deficiency judgment even had Franklin given fully adequate
notice of resale. See 398 A.2d at 343 & n.3. Under that act, a consumer is not personally
liable to the creditor for repossessed or voluntarily surrendered goods with a cash price of
$2,000 or less. D.C. CODE § 28-3812(e)(3) (1973). Two other provisions of title 28, however,
appear to exempt banks and savings and loan associations, permitting them to enforce in-
stallment sales contracts for automobiles through repossession and deficiency suits. D.C.
CODE §§ 28-3812(a), 28-3601 (1973). Because Franklin is neither a bank nor a savings and
loan association, it would not appear to have been privileged to a deficiency suit against the
Randolphs, whose car had a cash price of less than $2,000. See 398 A.2d at 341.
Relying upon the anomalous result of creating such a preferred status for banks and sav-
ings and loan associations and upon a formal opinion of the Corporation Counsel to the
District government, the three-judge panel reasoned that Congress must have intended to
permit all automobile financers to enforce installment sales contracts through repossession
and deficiency suits. 368 A.2d at 1154-55. The panel was forced to address this issue be-
cause it went on to hold that Franklin was entitled to a deficiency judgment even though it
had failed to give the Randolphs proper notification of resale. 368 A.2d at 1155-56. The full
court, however, did not address the Consumer Credit Protection Act issue because it held
that failure to give proper notice independently deprived Franklin of its right to a deficiency
judgment. 398 A.2d at 347.
Because the full court vacated the panel's opinion, 398 A.2d at 341, the possibility exists
that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals may yet deny a large class of automobile
financers the right to pursue deficiency judgments on default. To the extent that the court
addressed the U.C.C. issue to avoid this result, the court may have been more sympathetic to
automobile financers than it acknowledged by adopting the condition precedent rule as a
means of staking out a middle ground between permitting automobile financers such as
Franklin to pursue deficiency judgments under the Uniform Commercial Code despite non-
compliance with its notice requirements and denying many deficiency judgments altogether
under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
103. See, e.g., 398 A.2d at 347; Twin Bridges Truck City, Inc. v. Hailing, 205 N.W.2d
736, 739 (Iowa 1973).
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ness of notice.'" Because the court provided secured creditors with no
guidance concerning what constitutes reasonable notification, and because
failure to give such notice after Randolph will undoubtedly result in the
forfeiture of sometimes substantial deficiency judgments, it seems appro-
priate to examine how reasonable notice of resale can be given. Because
what constitutes reasonable notification in the District is now an open
question, the prudent creditor should employ the strictest notification prac-
tices required in other jurisdictions.
Section 9-504(3) requires that notice "be sent by the secured party to the
debtor," not that it be received.° 5 Sending notice involves adequate post-
age and a proper address,' 6 both of which the creditor will have to prove.
He may also have to prove that the letter was written and actually
mailed. °7 Thus, although the Code does not so require, the creditor
should retain a dated copy of the notice, mail it by registered or certified
mail,0 8 and keep the receipt, which establishes adequate postage, proper
address, and actual posting, as well as the date of posting. If a registered
or certified notice is returned before the sale unclaimed rather than re-
fused, and the creditor knows of another reasonable means of contacting
the debtor, the creditor may have to take additional steps to satisfy the
notification requirement.0 9 Finally, the creditor must send notice of each
104. See, e.g., Herman Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1977).
105. See U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
106. See id § 1-201(38).
107. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Air Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 263, 180 S.E.2d 589, 590-
91 (1971).
108. In the case of repossessed cars, the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS require the following notices:
Within five days after any motor vehicle is repossessed, the holder shall deliver to
the buyer personally, or send him by registered or certified mail to his last known
address, a written notice stating (1) the buyer's right to redeem and the amount due
and payable; (2) the buyer's rights as to a resale and his liability for a deficiency;
and (3) the exact address where the motor vehicle is stored and the exact address
where any payment is to be made or notice delivered.
5AA D.C.R.R. § 5.2(a), D.C. Reg. 29 (special ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
The holder shall, at least 10 days prior to the date of any such public sale or auc-
tion, give written notice to the buyer of the time and place of such sale or auction,
which notice shall be delivered personally or sent by registered or certified mail, or,
in the case of a private sale, 10 days notice of the time after which such private sale
may be held.
5AA D.C.R.R. § 5.3, id at 30. The notices may be given before the expiration of the 15-day
redemption period prescribed in 5AA D.C.R.R., § 5.2(b). Id See 398 A.2d at 343-44.
109. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lloyd, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 15 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1973); Lloyd's Plan, Inc. v. Brown, 268 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1978); Mallicoat v. Volunteer
Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. at 112, 415 S.W.2d at 350. Contra, MFT Leasing v.
Fillmore Prods., Inc., 579 P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah 1978).
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and every contemplated sale. '0
Of course, the notice the creditor sends must be reasonable,''' and the
reasonableness of notice is a question of fact.' 12 What constitutes reasona-
bleness obviously depends upon the purpose of the notice provision. Un-
der Randolph, this purpose is to enable the debtor to exercise his right of
redemption or otherwise protect his interest in the collateral.' '3 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Rules and Regulations provide a minimum standard of
reasonableness for one kind of collateral by requiring the giving of written
notice at least ten days prior to the sale of a repossessed car.' l4 Thus, a
secured creditor in the District would probably be ill-advised to give less
than ten days' notice of the resale of any item of collateral unless it falls
into one of the exceptions enumerated in the Code.' Moreover, the more
valuable the collateral, the more advance notice the creditor might have to
give the debtor to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness, since the
greater the financial burden he must assume to exercise his right to re-
deem, the more time the debtor might need. The creditor may establish
reasonable notification provisions by contract,' 6 but he should bear in
mind that failure to follow them will result in defective notice.' '" In short,
given the penalty of the forfeited deficiency judgment, the guiding princi-
ple for the secured creditor in the District seeking to give "reasonable noti-
fication" must be knowledge of the most stringent requirements of the law
and scrupulous caution in observing them.
III. CONCLUSION
In Randolph v. Franklin Investment Co., the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals reasoned that the secured creditor should forfeit his right to a
110. See 398 A.2d at 344 (unsuccessful public sale followed by successful private sale);
DeLay First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 408-09, 243
N.W.2d 745, 751 (1976) (collateral disposed of in several transactions).
I 1. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
112. See, e.g., Baber v. Williams Ford Co., 239 Ark. 1054, 1058, 396 S.W.2d 302, 304
(1965); Bondurant v. Beard Equip. Co., 345 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. App. 1977); Ennis v. Atlas
Fin. Co., 120 Ga. App. 849, 850, 172 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1969).
113. See notes 70-91 and accompanying text supra. See also Wells v. Central Bank of
Ala., 347 So. 2d 114, 119 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (notice given after sale or when there is no
time to redeem the collateral prior to the sale); Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 93 Nev.
95, 97, 560 P.2d 917, 919 (1977) (notice must precede sale by enough time to permit debtor to
protect his interest in collateral).
114. See note 108 supra. On "giving notice," see U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
115. See note 5 supra.
116. See U.C.C. § 9-501(3).
117. See, e.g., Moody v. Nides Fin. Co., 115 Ga. App. 859, 860, 156 S.E.2d 310, 311
(1967); Twin Bridges Truck City, Inc. v. Hailing, 205 N.W.2d at 738.
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deficiency judgment for failure to give proper notice of resale because such
notice secures important rights for the debtor which are inadequately pro-
tected by other default provisions of the Code. Plausible on its surface, the
reasoning of the court is deeply flawed. Although the notice of resale after
default does secure a period of time within which the debtor may redeem,
the notice requirement was not designed to assist the debtor in defending
himself in a deficiency suit. Further, the drafters of the Code thought the
requirement that the creditor conduct the resale in a commercially reason-
able manner and his liability for not doing so to be equal to the ends of
justice, and they proved to be so in Randolph, buttressed as they were by
the trial court's use of the rebuttable presumption that the collateral was
worth at least the amount of the outstanding debt. Finally, holding proper
notice of resale to be a condition precedent to the right to a deficiency
judgment is a punitive remedy, and punitive remedies are expressly disfa-
vored by the Code.
The unpersuasiveness of the Randolph opinion is unfortunate, for the
court imperiled the legitimate interests of secured creditors, leaving them
to fend for themselves. Because what constitutes reasonable notice of re-
sale is an open question in the District and because the consequence for
failing to give it is the forfeiture of the right to a deficiency judgment,
secured creditors should conform their notification practices to the judicial
maxima prescribed in the various jurisdictions.
Joseph Longino
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